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ABSTRACT  
The sheer complexity of sustainability transitions makes it vital to develop simplifying 
conceptual frameworks. Starting from the contrast between the mainstream innovation-
economics and systems-innovation/evolutionary literatures, this paper begins by 
summarising the "Three Domains" framework, which relates technology innovation and 
adoption choices to different domains of socio-economic decision-making, at successfully 
larger scale of time and social structures. We note the high-level implications for policy 
packages and illustrate the main themes through three electricity technology examples 
(lighting, fossil fuel generation, and low carbon power systems), and use these also to show 
that the relative importance of different policy pillars may differ substantially according to 
the technology and context.  We then relate this to the "innovation chain" (another 
simplifying framework) approach to vertical innovation and show how this can help to 
explain radical differences in innovation intensities between different sectors. We then 
expand the innovation chain framework from technology to the multiple journeys required 
for successful innovation, ordered according to levels of decision-making and hence 
domains. We conclude by indicating how this can help identify key blockages in energy 
transformations, and potentially help to reconcile the classical innovation-economics with 
systems innovation / evolutionary perspectives, and explain their currently divergent policy 
recommendations.  
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1. Introduction  
In Autumn 2015, the UK hosted two major international conferences on theories of innovation within 
an hour’s travel of each other, just a few days apart.  Participants travelled from around the world to 
attend. The most striking feature, however, was the almost complete lack of interaction: only one 
name appeared on the participation list of both meetings. One conference was on the economics of 
innovation; the other, a meeting of innovation systems researchers. They represented different 
worlds. 
This paper concerns that gulf. The two communities tend to different forms of analysis and reach 
different policy prescriptions, and the disconnect between mainstream economics of innovation on 
the one hand, and systems innovation/evolutionary perspectives on the other, is an important 
obstacle to effective innovation policy. We summarise the underlying conceptual differences and 
argue that bridging these perspectives is crucial to effective innovation policy and the development 
of policy mixes, illustrated throughout with particular reference to the nature of, lessons from, and 
policy challenges facing the transformation of the energy sector.  
Against this background this paper has the following specific objectives. 
Our conceptual aim is to offer a broad framework for and categorisation of the processes involved in 
transforming complex systems, within which to locate both the mainstream innovation-economics, 
and innovation systems/evolutionary perspectives and literatures; this allows us to illustrate how the 
different approaches focus on different aspects of the overall challenge. Thus we develop a relatively 
simple set of conceptual tools that bridge the economics and systems literatures, drawing on insights 
from both. Through this we aim to narrow – or at least explain - the intellectual gulf between these 
approaches, and offer a wide but conceptually simple map of transformation processes (which 
necessarily combine innovation and diffusion), particularly relating to lessons from the energy sector 
and current debates about energy transformation. 
Our second objective concerns policy.  We offer both data and explanations to suggest that energy 
systems display particular characteristics which make transformation unusually challenging, with 
theoretical divergences further impeding effective policy. Policies to transform energy systems have 
been strongly contested politically, in part because of the different world-views of the innovation-
economics compared to the systems innovation / evolutionary literatures.  An obvious example is the 
scorn that many economists expressed for renewable energy targets, and German PV supports in 
particular, commonly arguing for policy beyond R&D to be ‘technology neutral’ (eg. a single emissions 
target, not multiple targets, and main emphasis on carbon pricing).2 Whilst many energy economists 
have in the past decade nuanced their views and paid more attention to learning-by-doing, a clear gulf 
remains as we indicate later.  In contrast, systems innovation theorists and evolutionary perspectives 
have tended to emphasise cultivation of niche and growing markets for the most potentially important 
                                                          
2 Eg: as late as 2014, The Economist wrote that “solar power is by far the most expensive way of reducing 
carbon emissions …. the carbon price would have to rise to $185 a tonne before solar power shows a net 
benefit. …  governments should target emissions reductions from any source rather than focus on boosting 
certain kinds of renewable energy.”  Their article was based on a report by Frank (2014) – which only reflected 
a long-standing view of many economists, taking an equilibrium view of minimising abatement costs, and 
decried in particular Germany’s approach to solar PV – and the EU’s inclusion of a renewables target in its 
2020 package - as economic madness (e.g. Boehringer and Rosendahl, 2011; Helm, 2009). 
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technologies, even at high unit costs, using a wide range of policy actions, sometimes with less 
pronounced attention to issues of cost and economic incentives.  
The policy community often relies on relatively simple views of innovation based on traditional 
perspectives. Systems views sometimes struggle to get traction in high-level policy debates, hindered 
by unfamiliarity, complexity, and the difficulty of drawing clear policy conclusions. Despite increasing 
prominence of systems approaches in informing innovation policies design, in high-level forums 
innovation policy is often equated with just R&D funding. Our policy aim is thus to present a 
framework that makes clearer to policymakers how to understand and engage with the co-
evolutionary dynamics presented in the systems literature.  
Consequently, by developing a wider framework and classification of different processes and theories, 
and showing a certain complementarity in their roles, we aim as a third objective to shed new light on 
the rationales and multiple roles of policy packages, and thereby help to narrow policy differences and 
identify gaps that still impede the energy transition. 
Whilst seeking to build on the existing literatures, this paper also has a very practical origin.  Alongside 
academic roles,3 the lead author has been Chief Economist at the Carbon Trust – established in 2001 
as the UK’s main body working with industry to commercialise low carbon technologies – and then 
Senior Advisor to the UK energy regulator, Ofgem.  This paper offers an approach that reflects this 
practical experience, and thus whilst seeking to locate and build upon the academic literature, is not 
constrained by it.  
The paper is organized as follows. Following a brief review of the literatures most directly relevant to 
the main themes and classification of systems innovation theories (2), in section 3 we summarise the 
high-level ‘Three Domains’ framework of Grubb, Hourcade and Neuhoff (2014, 2015: hereafter the 
GHK framework). This organizes the main processes in terms of behavioural and organizational 
characteristics (‘satisficing’) that impede adoption of seemingly cost-effective technologies; the 
optimizing behaviours that underpin the mainstream economics literatures and provide the central 
theoretical basis for markets and cost-reflective pricing (‘optimising’); and the evolutionary and 
institutional characteristics of large-scale (non-marginal) changes in technologies, systems, and 
industrial and institutional structures (‘transforming’). We show how these operate a different scales 
and have clear and complementary roles in the space defined by the relationship of resource inputs 
to economic outputs. 
From this basis, the subsequent section (4) summarizes briefly how this underpins three high-level 
categories of policy instruments and explains their relationship to transformation processes, and in 
particular to the classical economic policy distinction between horizontal and vertical innovation 
policies, and the increasingly influential discourse on mission-oriented innovation.  
To illustrate the main concepts and provide some empirical basis, we then (section 5) chart the 
evolution of three categories of electricity technologies – lighting, fossil fuel generation, and 
renewable energy technologies and associated features of overall electricity systems – across the high-
level map of resource inputs and economic outputs.   
                                                          
3 Part time academic appointments at the Faculty of Economics, Cambridge University, and subsequently 
Professor of International Energy and Climate Change Policy at UCL. Running alongside roles as Associated 
Director of Policy (2001-4), and subsequently Chief Economist (2004-2009) at the UK Carbon Trust; and at 
Ofgem as Senior Advisor, Sustainable Energy Policy (2011-15), and Improving Regulation (2015-16). Outside 
academia, Grubb now chairs the UK government Panel of Technical Experts on Electricity Market Reform. 
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To move the paper towards the more specific stages of innovation processes, section 6 then revisits 
some concepts and literature around the ‘innovation chain’. Though sometimes criticized as a re-
invention of a simplistic and long-refuted linear model, we argue that when properly understood it in 
fact offers a compelling way of explaining the relationship between ‘technology push’ and ‘demand 
pull’, within a wider system context which can in turn be linked back to the Three Domains framework. 
We show that this can also help to explain major differences in innovation intensity between sectors 
and argue why this is crucial to understanding the needs of innovation policy particularly with respect 
to energy-related sustainability concerns.   
In the final section we expand the innovation chain framework to show in fact it can accommodate 
several layers of complexity relevant to policymaking particularly for ‘vertical’ innovation policy with 
sector-specific technologies.  Finally, we use our approach to suggest that many of the differing 
outlooks between the two communities noted arises from inadequate attention to the multiple 
domains of real-world decision-processes.  
 
2. Context and links to existing literature  
Innovation is complex, and as our understanding of it has improved the field of innovation studies has 
also increased in its complexity. This trend appears also to have increased the gulf between 
mainstream economic thought and systems innovation theories, which have evolved through largely 
different communities. Yet the divergence dates back even to historical approaches to problems with 
multiple goals (contrast the famous Tinbergen rule (1952; 1956) of one instrument for each goal, with 
Lindblom’s (1958) critique); the gulf has merely taken on somewhat different forms in the context of 
modern economic treatments of endogenous technical change (eg. The extensive modeling studies in 
the Innovation Modelling Comparison Project (Edenhofer et al, 2006), still had little reference to the 
systems innovation literature).  
The different schools moreover frequently produce different policy recommendations.  The 
economics community tends to emphasise the role of pricing and R&D (eg. Acemoglu et al 2012), 
justified with specific reference to identifying where the market barriers may lie (eg. Jaffe, Newell and 
Stavins 2005), and with patents as the main index of innovation (eg. Dechezleprêtre et al 2011). They 
emphasise classic economic concerns: expected profitability and return on investment, prices, and so 
on. There is much less emphasis on intangible aspects (norms, cognitive routines, the visions that 
motivate and align innovators), or on the co-evolution of technology with institutions and politics.  
The systems innovation community uses different language and emphasizes far more the dynamic, 
complex, interdependent and evolutionary nature of innovation, with strong emphasis also upon the 
learning-by-doing, infrastructure, and institutions associated with deployment (eg. Nelson and Winter 
1982; Geels and Schot 2005).  In contrast to the economics of innovation literature, this literature pays 
much less attention to prices and cost trajectories.  
Both schools recognise the need for multiple policy instruments (which may be defined as a tool or 
technique used by government in order to achieve a policy goal (Howlett, 2005)), to be combined into 
a policy instrument mix to achieve (single or multiple) policy objectives. For example, from the 
economics perspective, Jaffe, Newell and Stavins (2005) conclude that the interaction of market 
failures associated with environmental pollution and with innovation and diffusion of new 
technologies provide a strong rationale for a portfolio of instruments that foster emissions reduction 
alongside the development and adoption of environmentally beneficial technology. Lehman (2010) 
supports this rationale, and indicates that a policy mix is also justified if the implementation of 
individual first-best instruments produces high transaction costs (although as Costantini et al (2017) 
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highlights, care must be taken not to introduce an indiscriminate number of instruments, which may 
prove counterproductive).  
From the systems innovation perspective, Nill and Kemp (2009) argue that multiple instruments are 
required in order to overcome practical constraints provided by technical, institutional, political, and 
economic realities and uncertainties, and their dynamic co-evolution. In turn, the dynamic influences 
and effects of instruments themselves are important. 
Various typologies of environmental policy instruments may be found in the literature (see Jordan, 
Wurzel and Zito (2013, p.26) for a recent overview), although attempts to combine environmental and 
innovation policy instrument typologies are relatively new (e.g. Nauwelaers et al, 2009). In such 
typologies, categories are commonly defined by the primary purpose of the instrument, or their main 
modus operandi. Rogge and Reichardt (2016) employ both elements to elaborate a 3x3 ‘type-purpose’ 
matrix typology, drawing on previous literature (with ‘type’ defined as ‘economic instruments’, 
‘regulation’ and ‘information’, and ‘purpose’ defined as ‘technology push’, ‘demand pull’ and 
‘systemic’). Few typologies explicitly base their instrument categories on the underlying economic and 
decision-making processes upon which instruments operate. 
Although often synonymous in the literature (as evidenced by the definitions provided by Rogge and 
Reichardt (2016, p.1612)), a ‘policy instrument mix’ must be distinguished from the broader concept 
of a ‘policy mix’. Rogge and Reichardt (2016) outline three building blocks in their extended definition 
of a policy mix for sustainability transitions – ‘elements’ (i.e. the policy instruments themselves, and 
associated objectives), ‘policy processes’ (i.e. the processes by which the ‘elements’ in the mix are 
arrived at), and ‘characteristics’ (consistency of ‘elements’, ‘coherence’ of processes, ‘credibility’ and 
‘comprehensiveness’). 
This paper complements the existing literature by proposing a simplifying framework that gives clear 
and complementary spaces to the insights from mainstream innovation-economics and systems 
innovation perspectives. In turn, this may be used to evaluate the characteristics of policy and policy 
instrument mixes for innovation for sustainable transitions, and inform their future development.  
The benefit of conceptual simplification is not necessarily to aid centralized coordination.  As Flanagan, 
Uyarra and Laranja (2011) persuasively argued, centralized policy coordination may to a large extent 
be a chimera.  As emphasized by broadly evolutionary approaches (e.g. Cooke, Uranga and Etxebarria, 
1998; Geels, 2002; Iammarino, 2005), and as our understanding of the sheer complexity of policy 
processes also deepens towards an evolutionary perspective (e.g. John, 2003; Metcalfe, 1993), the 
challenge of central coordination becomes ever more problematic. Indeed, one of the ‘four dangers’ 
in innovation policy studies proposed by Flanagan and Uyarra (2016) is excessive faith in rational 
design and co-ordination of policy mixes.  
Another danger highlighted by Flanagan and Uyarra (2016) is the treatment of policy instruments 
simply as tools to be selected from a toolbox. An individual instrument, much less a mix, exhibits a 
high degree of interpretive flexibility – their definition, objectives, implementation and outcomes may 
vary spatially and temporally, and across different types and levels of actors (del Rio and Howlett, 
2013; Flanagan, Uyarra and Lrannja, 2011). As such, no conceptual framework may be predictive or 
prescriptive regarding specific policy instruments to introduce, and their effects, as a universally 
applicable rule. 
Rather, we argue, simpler conceptual frameworks can offer a more useful map of the components 
that comprise a broader and more complex innovation ecosystem. These include the interactive role 
of different actors, economic processes, and policies that can accelerate (or hinder) the transition to 
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an environmentally sustainable techno-economic system. Coordination can then better emerge from 
the system, much in the way that natural ecosystems reflect apparently extraordinary degrees of 
coordination without any central planner.  
 
3. The Three Domains 
We approach this task starting with one simple framework, namely the ‘Three Domains’ of socio-
economic decision-making advanced by Grubb, Hourcade and Neuhoff (2014, 2015), hereafter GHN 
(2014).  
The first Domain concerns the behavioural, social and contractual characteristics that influence (and 
frequently impede) the adoption even of existing, cost-effective technologies. Component concepts 
include behavioural economics, with its emphasis on risk aversion, habits, myopia and vicarious 
learning (eg. Kahneman 2012), much of which corresponds in large measure to what economics has 
termed ‘satisficing’ behavior – the term used to reflect situation in which people appear to be 
‘satisfied enough’ not to change demonstrably sub-optimal conditions.  It also encompasses many 
strands of organizational theory (eg. principal-agent effects), transactional analysis, contract theory 
including incomplete and missing contracts (eg. tenant-landlord relationships), etc.  Together these 
form what GHN (2014) term ‘First Domain’ characteristics. It has a close relationship to concepts of 
‘bounded rationality’, though extends substantially beyond this specific idea.  For a recent analysis 
with reference to climate policy modelling see Safarzyńska (2017). 
Though GHN (2014) focus examples of this with respect to the energy efficiency gap, in reality it has a 
far broader interpretation; it encompasses many of the processes of (and impediments to) the 
diffusion of technologies, beyond the purely cost/market-driven.  First Domain analysis is intrinsic to 
innovation studies insofar as it can shed light on the challenges and timescales of technology diffusion. 
The second Domain characterizes optimizing behavior. This is the world in which agents – consumers, 
firms and others – act according to the principles of neoclassical economics, with behavior 
approximating to the implications of conscious, evaluated decisions to minimize costs and maximize 
personal or organizational benefits. The underlying assumptions (acknowledged or not) are well 
mapped out by (Staub-Kaminski et al 2014), who from this offer a more detailed typology of ‘market 
failures’ with a clear mapping on the Three Domains framework (Grubb, Hourcade and Neuhoff 2015). 
In second Domain processes, Innovating activity and investments occur but mostly within an 
acknowledged ‘innovation possibilities frontier’, as also constrained by existing infrastructures and 
institutions. Policy prescriptions emerging from this Domain tend to relate most to markets and 
relative prices, with interventions justified with reference to market failures and direct externalities.  
The third Domain encompasses evolutionary and institutional processes. This embodies more explicit 
theories of innovation systems and transformation, taking into account the role not only of innovation 
in discrete technologies, but also the roles of infrastructure, institutions, network effects, learning-by-
doing and path-dependencies, amongst other factors.  For a recent extensive review in relation to 
sustainability transitions see Rogge and Reichardt (2016). 
The distinction between the different domains – and the fundamental reasons why an approach 
framed in terms of the role of technologies in transforming resources into economic outputs has only 
three- can be readily illustrated as in Figure 1.  The left hand panel shows the simple concept of what 
we can call the ‘best practice frontier’ – reflecting the leading commercially available ways to produce 
a given output (service or welfare) (horizontal axis) for a given use of key resource inputs or pollution 
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outputs (the vertical axis).  Restricting the use of a resource (e.g. fossil fuels) or the generation of 
pollution (e.g. CO2 emissions) comes at a cost to the services or welfare (i.e. the sum of producer and 
consumer surplus) provided by such activities, at least in the short term, because other factors (eg. 
more capital or labour, or some other more expensive resource) must be used – substituted  - instead.   
 
The frontier defines that trade-off.  The curve is in practice fuzzy because of the scope for differing 
interpretations of what is ‘commercially available’, and the different discount rates, risk aversions or 
other criteria, that might be applied, in different contexts. Obviously, the idea can be generalised to 
any number of resources and associated dimensions. In the context of energy transitions, think of the 
vertical as representing energy use and associated emissions, whilst the horizontal axis is the service 
(value) provided per unit energy.4  In section 5 we illustrate this more specifically with a few examples.  
 
Any economy comprises thousands, or indeed millions, of curves associated with different resources, 
activities and services. Much of welfare economics is, fundamentally, about how economies can be 
designed to optimise the trade-offs defined by such curves, across the enormous range of resources 
available - largely as determined through market structures and relative prices, the prime mechanisms 
for transmitting information about the scarcity and value of the different resources available.  
The simpler levels of analyses are time independent – hence the term ‘equilibrium’ economics.  In this 
condition, given an assumption of optimising behaviour, no agents would be to the left of the line 
since they could improve welfare, without any greater use of resources, by moving to the line.  In this 
sense the frontier embodies the classical economic concepts of supply curves.  
Time then enters through movement of the curve itself – technical change, which increases the output 
available from use of a given resource, for example. The classical economics and modelling literature 
tends to make one of two simplifying assumption regarding such innovation.  One is that this process 
is autonomous – it occurs from outside the frame of reference, like manna from heaven (or spillover 
from other sectors, or from R&D programmes that do not enter in the model).  The other, more 
sophisticated, approach is to assume that such innovation is part of optimising processes - the product 
of economic agents maximising their benefits from innovations, and the product of accumulated 
investment in knowledge which then forms part of the economic production function.   
                                                          
4 In this format the public policy objective can be interpreted as moving right (increase welfare), whilst reducing 
energy consumption and emissions (moving down).   Note that the frontier in economics is often called the 
‘possibilities frontier’, which is potentially confusing as soon as one brings innovation into consideration. Also 
economic textbooks would typically draw the curve as a straight line, and hardly ever show it bending backwards. 
However, there is such a thing as excessive energy consumption or emission levels, which would damage 
economic output – and indeed, plenty of evidence that this is not uncommon, in part through subsidies and the 
impacts of high oil price volatility on oil-dependent economies.  
8 
 
Figure 1: The technology ‘best practice’ frontier - (a) basic resource and supply curve and (b) resources 
and economic outputs in the Three Domains  
In this illustration, the other two domains enter as illustrated in Figure 1 (b). Phenomena of the first 
Domain lie to the left of the line, producing less output than potentially available using ‘best practice’ 
for the same resource use. Clearly, this creates the potential for improvements apparently without 
any trade-offs. 
The implied assumption of most economic theory is that self-interested individuals and organisations, 
given the freedom to do so, will naturally move to the ‘frontier’.  When reality differs from this ideal, 
neoclassical economics generally attributes this to various forms of market and institutional failures, 
transaction costs or other ‘hidden’ costs that are incompletely measured, and time lags in catching up 
with a moving target as innovation moves the best practice frontier. However as noted in the previous 
section, first Domain (or ‘satisficing’) behaviour implies that actually, most people fall well short of 
this. So do real organisations. It is principally the experimental evidence underpinning behavioural and 
managerial economics, which has revealed and explained this as a systematic feature of human 
psychology and organisation, rather than an anomaly that people or organisations will quickly and 
spontaneously deal with.5  
On the other side of the line, the ‘best practice frontier’ defined by available technologies and systems 
moves over time: technologies and organisational structures improve to allow the same output with 
less input of resources.  The third Domain is defined by the question not of whether the curve moves 
– whether there is innovation – but by how and where it moves – the pace and direction of innovation.  
The simplest workhorse assumption is innovation that is ‘resource neutral’ – it occurs equally across 
all inputs. This is obviously unrealistic. Nothing fundamental changes if the pace of innovation – in this 
case, the efficiency of using resources – is projected to vary for different resources.   
Innovation economics gets far more interesting when it looks at how technology evolution may be 
channelled, accelerated and oriented eg. to reduce the use of more expensive or damaging inputs.  As 
noted, this applies not only to innovation per se, but the development of infrastructure, rules and 
institutions associated with the use of major resources and associated technological systems. These 
possibilities help to define the third Domain, in which changes in technology, institutions, 
infrastructure and more can influence the whole direction in which systems develop. Over time this 
                                                          
5 Note however that such behavioural and organisational theories only form part of the First Domain realities, 
which comprise all the factors which lead to societies operating far short of the frontier. See references in the 
introduction.  
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may fundamentally reshape the ‘best practice’ frontier, as per the direction of the movement of the 
curve in Figure 1b, and illustrated by the three different arrows of how the frontier might evolve. 
The essential point emphasized in GHN (2014: Chapter 2) is that the different dsomains are not 
competing explanations of the same phenom`ena, nor is it simply that they have different 
relationships to the ‘best practice frontier’ of Figure 1. Rather, they describe different processes which 
occur at different scales: different social scales of decision-making, and different time horizons of 
those decisions and timescales over which consequences play out, as elaborated throughout GHN 
(2014). 
 
4. The policy matrix and alignment with ‘Mission-oriented’ innovation 
 
From this framework flows a natural approach to high-level mapping of policy mixes for sustainability 
transitions.  Each of the domains corresponds to a different type of change that is needed if we are to 
move towards more secure and less carbon-intensive energy systems.  For each of these, there are 
leading – though not exclusive – policy approaches (summarised in Figure 2 / Box 1).  
Box 1: The Three Pillars of Policy 
The Three Domains framework provides a natural policy mapping as illustrated in Figure 2: 
 
Figure 2: The policy matrix  
As summarised in GHN (2014)  
• Smarter choices can be fostered through appropriate standards and engagement. For 
example, energy efficiency regulation is typified by standards that ensure adequate insulation 
in buildings, remove inefficient products from the market, or require producers to display 
clear and unambiguous information to inform consumers.  Engagement starts with such 
information and may build upon it in many ways to increase attention to, motivate, and 
facilitate, better choices.  
• Most economic decisions to buy, sell or invest in cleaner products and processes depend on 
markets and prices. Measures that affect absolute and relative prices – including carbon 
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pricing - will tend to be the strongest and most relevant lever operating through market 
transactions. In practice their impact will also depend on market structure - many big energy 
sector investments are in sectors (like electricity), which if not directly conducted by state 
entities, are nevertheless strongly influenced by the rules and regulations that shape the 
market structure and related terms of investment.   
• Technology innovation and infrastructure can be accelerated and guided in low-carbon 
directions partly by price incentives, but we illustrate in this paper the extent to which private 
investment in energy innovation is neither adequate in scale, nor likely to lead mainly in a low-
carbon direction, unless there is either public involvement or other factors influencing 
strategic expectations.  Infrastructure is also crucial.  Hence, the key determinant will be 
strategic investment – investment in which the public returns exceed any conceivable returns 
to private investors, fostered by direct public support or other influences which, looking 
beyond short term private returns, support the evolution of more efficient and lower carbon 
energy systems.  
Source: adapted from GHN (2014), Chapter 2. 
END BOX ===================================== 
 
These form the three pillars of policy. They are illustrated in Figure 2 in a way that seeks to underline 
that each pillar has a prime focus of impact on the economics processes and opportunities in the 
respective Domain, but also influences the others. These interactions are, in fact, not peripheral, but 
central to the overall argument.  
This is fundamentally because the domains themselves interact, and influence innovations. Thus for 
example markets and prices most centrally influence the decisions of economic actors seeking to 
optimize choices from existing products and processes, but may also raise awareness eg. of energy 
wastage (first Domain) and (along with R&D tax breaks) affect private sector strategic judgements 
around the costs and benefits of investments in energy innovations (third Domain).6   As emphasized, 
classical economics recognizes the movement of the frontier, whether it is assumed to occur 
exogenously, or analysed as a function of R&D / knowledge accumulation and the incentives in 
competitive markets.  The policy discourse is however framed in terms of identifying and fixing market 
failures. Thus for example in the context of climate change, the mainstream economics discourse 
emphasises competitive markets and carbon pricing, with technology spillovers the main justification 
for R&D expenditures and tax breaks. 
The associated economics literature on innovation policies has long distinguished between such 
generic horizontal innovation policies, and more sector- or technology-specific vertical policies, which 
come closer to specific industrial policies.7   
                                                          
6 Even within second Domain reasoning one might consider the differentiation of R&D tax credits to 
acknowledge likely differences in the social return on R&D in different sectors (e.g. see Castellacci & Liu 2015), 
and argue that universally applicable R&D tax credits should be removed for innovation in activities likely to 
exacerbate ‘public bads’, on the basis of a lower expected social return. 
7 Horizontal innovation policies of course also move the frontier, introducing potential ambiguity into the 
terminology of the framework as displayed by Figure 1; however the authors suggest that purely horizontal 
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The main concern of this article is with transformative processes and associated policies.  It follows 
from the above that all three policy pillars can be understood as having innovation effects, as all can 
influence the frontier, whether directly or indirectly. Pillar II policies are typically broadly horizontal, 
targeted at economy-wide policy goals rather than focused on specific technologies. For reasons 
outlined below, in energy at least they tend to induce innovation along incremental trajectories 
favoured by incumbent actors.  
Pillar I policies are often sector-specific (rather than technology specific) and so fall somewhere 
between the horizontal and vertical dichotomy. Such policies, while aimed at driving adoption of 
already cost-effective technologies, can also result in movement of the technology frontier, through 
the mechanisms outlined by Porter & van der Linde (1995). Twenty years on, evidence for this ‘Porter 
Hypothesis’ – that environmental regulation could stimulate valuable innovation – has strengthened, 
(Ambec et al 2013), and refined to indicate that economic gains from such innovation are more likely 
when regulations stimulate process rather than end-of pipe innovations (Wagner 2003)). 
The economic lens has tended to place the emphasis on horizontal policies, to enhance the innovative 
potential of many markets. The key characteristic is that such approaches embody a neutrality view 
of innovation; more may well be better, but the market – as influenced also by price signals to reflect 
externalities, and perhaps regulation justified by market failures – is the best vehicle for determining 
the direction of innovation (for a recent exposition, see Fischer, Newell and Preonas, 2013).  
This contrasts sharply with the view that public policy should have a mission in supporting innovation 
with a public purpose – that it should influence the direction in which the frontier evolves in ways 
beyond the classical market prescriptions. That purpose may be simply to improve economic 
performance and competiveness in particular sectors, but the influential research of Mazzucato (2013) 
argues that the mission should often target other public goods, like health and environment. This 
implies a large role for vertical innovation policies, which correlate closely with the Pillar III policies of 
strategic investment in Figure 2. This article focuses particularly on such innovation in the energy 
sector, which aim not only to enhance innovation, but also to give it direction, to address the sector-
specific concerns of the ‘energy trilemma’ (security, affordability, and sustainability).   
Even though this approach highlights the importance of strategic investment in innovation, we 
emphasise that transformative processes are not confined to such Pillar III policies: indeed, this is a 
central point. Innovation may be promoted also by Pillar I policies, if for example standards are set 
aggressively close to the technology frontier (or even slightly beyond it), or if technology is linked with 
innovations in first Domain processes:  behaviour, regulations, organisational routines and other ways 
of making better use of advancing technologies, and thus providing ‘demand pull’ for investment at 
or beyond the technology frontier – extending the mechanisms of the Porter Hypothesis.   
                                                          
polices are best seen as fitting within the markets (second) Domain at least for as long as they are technology 
neutral. A review of the distinction and literature around horizontal vs vertical innovation policies is given by 
the OECD (Warwick 2013), which notes the close intellectual link between vertical innovation policy and the 
development of industrial policy initiatives in many countries, and suggests reasons for the rapid re-emergence 
of interest in industrial strategy in the OECD countries. Note that Crafts (2010) highlights three specific types of 
market failure, related to (i) infant-industry-related capital market failures; agglomeration externalities; and rent-
switching via strategic trade policy.  The first two have clear parallels with the analysis respectively of 
technology valley of death, and learning-by-doing, effects noted in this paper.  
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Moreover as already noted, innovation is also intrinsic to second Domain processes – indeed, their 
openness to innovation is one of the classical economic arguments for markets, in which private R&D 
may also be enhanced by ‘horizontal’ innovation policies (like generic R&D tax breaks on the grounds 
that markets tend to systematically underinvest in innovation), whilst prices (including taxes) 
obviously influence the direction of market incentives for innovation.  
An effective policy mix for mission-oriented innovation can thus be understood as one which spans 
the bottom row of Figure 2, embracing and selecting tools from all three policy pillars.  Which, as we 
now show, has indeed been the story behind major innovations already observed in the energy sector. 
 
5. Applying the conceptual framework in practice - three examples 
 
Before delving further into theory, we consider briefly some examples drawn from different electricity 
related technologies, to illustrate specific applications of the ‘Frontier’ diagram, and the way in which 
policies across all three pillars have – in different circumstances – influenced energy innovation. The 
three technologies examined – lighting, fossil fuel electricity generation and overall low-carbon 
electricity systems - are all of clear and significant relevance to the low-carbon energy transition, and 
are chosen to represent technologies and systems of different types (e.g. supply, end-use and 
network-dependent), and scales (small individual electricity-using units, large-scale centralized 
generation, and system level technologies). 
 
(a) Lighting 
 
Figure 3 illustrates the case of lighting technologies. Here, the key service involved is provision of light 
(measured in lumens); the relevant resource input (y-axis) is electricity inputs per lumen; the welfare-
related output is lumens per $/€ expenditure.  The graph shows three frontier curves approximating 
the commercial availability of lighting technologies up to approximately 1990, in the 2000s, and by 
2015, respectively.  
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Figure 3: Technology frontier – evolution for lighting  
 
The technology story can be largely told through the evolution of three technologies, and their use 
and status over these periods:  
 By 1990, incandescent bulbs dominated domestic lighting and formed a mature industry, as 
typified by the ubiquitous 100W and 60W bulbs. The technical efficiency had improved only 
slightly over the previous three decades, producing a maximum below 25 lumens per watt (Glenny 
and Proctor, 1992) – the actual lamps in situ were frequently older and/or made to lesser 
standards and/or fittings, and hence far less efficient (as indicated by the area of “residential” 
crosses). The subsequent decade saw some cost reductions (but little efficiency improvement) in 
incandescent bulbs (Menanteaua and Lefebvreb, 2000), as illustrated by the upper line in Figure 
3. 
 The ‘best practice’ frontier up to 1990 also comprised various forms of fluorescent tubes, widely 
used in the commercial sector, with lighting up to four times the energy efficiency of 
incandescents, but they were typically more expensive and required a tube up to a meter long 
(Glenny and Proctor, 1992). However the technology was evolving rapidly into far more compact 
forms so that by 2000, compact fluorescent bulbs were commercially and competitively available 
for household fittings, reducing energy use per lumen several fold (Bladh and Krantz, 2008). This 
decade saw rapid cost reductions (the middle technology line) and they began to dominate the 
market.  
 Light Emitting Diodes (LEDs) in 1990 were mostly known in the electronics industry but not 
commercially available for lighting; they intrinsically offer much higher efficiencies again, but 
initially were far too limited and costly. They only started to emerge for normal lighting 
applications, initially in quite specialized niches, around 2000.  They then improved rapidly, 
offering far lower energy use at scale (being around ten times more efficient than incandescents) 
and ultimately lower all-round costs and (as the technologies evolved) better variety and 
controllability (the lowest line in Figure 3) (Almeida et al , 2014) 
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In terms of lighting productivity this is an extraordinary evolution.  In the short term it has also led to 
a major reduction in the electricity use and environmental impact associated with lighting (though 
long-term technology studies have emphasized lighting as an emblematic example of rebound effects, 
with the transition from candles to kerosene lamps to incandescent bulbs being accompanied by an 
explosion of lumens, and more not less energy consumption (eg. Fouquet and Pearson 2006).  
 
The lighting case exemplifies the diverse nature of innovation processes and policy drivers.  The 
evolution of compact fluorescents was in part a simple commercial affair driven by the pursuit of 
improved service sector lighting products, but the clear potential to spill over in to domestic markets 
was then hugely stimulated by environmental pressures and government policies – many of which 
were essentially Pillar I policies (Mills and Schleich, 2014). In the early 1990s the EU introduced 
mandatory energy labelling on lightbulbs, along in many cases with forms of direct or indirect subsidies 
(eg. through ‘white certificate’ energy efficiency obligations on electricity suppliers). These helped to 
overcome persistent barriers, and evolved hand-in-hand with improved technologies.8   
 
This experience also shook up the old incandescent industry, and made it more alive to the rapidly 
developing potential for LEDs. These initially were a spillover from an entirely different sector, but 
then become an object of dedicated government support and rapid promotion, not just with R&D but 
also through labelling, supplier obligations, and in some countries government procurement – 
targeted market development. Shortly after 2010, technology had advanced so far that numerous 
governments followed the Australian example of then simply banning incandescent bulbs (Howarth 
and Rosenow, 2014) – hence the cutoff of the third frontier line in Figure 3, of a technology that had 
become economically redundant as well as environmentally damaging - whose practical demise could 
be much hastened by simply outlawing their sale to those still inclined to follow the comforting ‘first 
Domain’ habit of buying filament bulbs. 
 
(b) Fossil fuel power generation  
 
Figure 4: Technology frontier – evolution for fossil fuel power generation 
                                                          
8 Indeed it is interesting to read an evaluation from 1992: “The acceptance of compact fluorescent lamps in the 
very large domestic market is slow.  A major obstacle is that it is very difficult for the domestic user to balance 
energy savings against higher lamp costs … as sales increase, the cost of compact fluorescents will fall, though 
their greater complexity and material requirements mean they can never be as cheap as filament lamps.  At 
present they are bigger and heavier, and may not be suitable for some luminaires. Also some domestic users 
would prefer new lamps to look exactly like filament lamps..  another unfamiliar characteristics is the warm-up 
period to full light output. This has recently been reduced….  Some of the electricity supply companies have 
drawn attention to the ‘power factor’, a characteristic which will be improved in the next generation of lamps.’ 
(Glenny and Proctor 1992, p.101).  The barriers did not only apply to domestic CFLs: “High frequency 
developments may not obtain a share above about 10% in the batten market unless there is action by 
governments to favour the more energy efficient products.” 
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Figure 4 illustrates the evolution of the frontier diagram over the same period for fossil fuel power 
generation, this time with the resource input intensity being in terms of CO2 per unit of kWh 
generation, and the output-welfare indicator being kWh/$.  It shows the technology evolution for coal 
and gas generation respectively, each of which went through significant changes:  
 
 In most systems, Coal dominated power generation around 1990, with large thermal stations 
reaching conversion efficiencies around 35% compared to the 20-25% efficiency typical of many 
older plant still in widespread use.  As materials improved and the technology honed further, there 
were some further gains, particularly the higher efficiency of supercritical plant, which may reach 
around 47% (Hussy et al, 2014).  But in cost terms, these were running up against the limits of 
scale economies, and increasingly offset by tougher environmental policy – which by raising the 
cost of emissions (with SO2, mercury and NOx controls preceeding the impact of carbon policies) 
has the economic effect of tilting the curve backwards, since gas is generally the cleaner fuel on 
most counts.  Stripped of the impact of coal wholesale prices, the costs of coal power stagnated 
or rose, particularly where carbon prices began to be applied, as implied by the top end of the 
curve going backwards from around 2000 – but of course, remained in widespread use. 
 Gas turbines for power generation were technically quite well developed already by 1990, drawing 
substantially on advances for initially military and then civil aviation. They had previously been 
largely confined to peaking roles, and entrenched models of state-run utilities tended to 
perpetuate this even though CCGTs already looked competitive on paper by 1990 in many regions 
(Buxton, 1992). The liberalization of power generation in much of Europe and the Americas 
combined with greater availability of natural gas and rising environmental pressures changed the 
dynamics.  Whilst many old and less efficient installations remained, there followed rapid market 
growth, cost reductions and a leap in efficiency gains using combined cycle plants, as suggested 
by the curves (Hussy et al, 2014) 
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 CCS in principle offers much lower emissions and has long been held as ‘demonstrated’ – but only, 
as indicated, with a considerable cost penalty (Rubin et al, 2007) and with rather slow evolution. 
 
The relative economics of coal and gas still depend on the combination of gas and coal prices with the 
nature and degree of environmental pressures, but in many systems new coal investment looks at 
best a dubious choice compared to gas, which is environmentally as well as often economically 
preferable (Lazard, 2017), as suggested by the almost vertical line for 2015.   
 
In the case of these fossil fuel generating technologies, the innovation largely emerged from the 
combination of market pressures (including direct or implicit internalization of environmental costs) 
(Markard and Truffer, 2006), and spillovers from defence, aviation and materials sectors. Being large 
supply technologies, classical economic incentives dominated; and – beyond the generally high level 
of state involvement in all the sectors concerned - there was little need for direct state-led strategic 
investment to try and change the nature, pace or direction.  It was thus classic ‘Second Domain’-led 
innovation, embracing spillovers from other (often State-sponsored sectors), and learning-by-doing 
accelerated by market growth. Over time, the innovation was considerable, but it was also in the 
direction that suited and sustained the main interests and business models of the heavy engineering 
firms and utilities involved.   
 
c) Renewables and low carbon electricity systems  
 
Alongside these developments, more radical change was occurring most notably in renewable energy 
technologies. The developments have been well documented but are nonetheless striking, the 
strategically most important ones being with wind and PV.  Both of these saw major improvements 
already during the 1980s which moved them from little more than curiosities to viable technologies 
with costs that had fallen by around 50% (wind) and 70% (PV) by 1990 during the decade (Lantz et al, 
2012; REN21, 2013).  This was followed with steady (for wind from 1990)9 and more explosive (for PV 
from c. 2000) market growth with the latter eventually culminating with the ‘solar surprise’ as long-
promised economies finally emerged to bring PV also within cost comparability to conventional power 
sources. (Lazard, 2017). 
 
This was not however a simple story of technology innovation. There were technology spillovers (from 
semiconductor industries to PV; from aviation and materials to wind). There were focused R&D and 
development programmes to hone leading technology candidates and map the resources and 
interactions eg. of windfarms.  Supply chains developed and industries grew. The major developments 
over the recent decades however were fostered mainly by subsidized markets – notably, feed-in tariffs 
(Johnstone et al, 2010). Klassen et al (2005) were amongst the first to try and disentangle effects of 
                                                          
9 In the aftermath of the 1970s oil shocks, from 1980 to 1990 the unit size of commercially-available wind 
turbines grew from around 50 to 150kW, with hugely improved load factors and a halving of capital costs. 
These gains stemmed from R&D & development programmes combined with heavily subsidized deployment 
predominantly in Denmark and California. During the 1990s the industry professionalized around dominant 
designs, and grew with the entry of the major international engineering firms, and growing markets across 
Europe in particular.  During the 2000s, typical unit sizes grew to over 1MW with energy costs halved from 
those of 1990, and started moving into offshore waters. 
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R&D from deployment in cost reductions, and a recent study by Bruegel underlines the 
complementarity of R&D and deployment in wind energy’s development.10  
 
As the technologies themselves became more plausible, there were institutional impediments (eg. 
with major struggles over planning permissions and grid connections) and questions about capacity 
and costs of balancing and backup on power systems – in the early years it was commonly asserted 
that grids could not cope with more than 5 or 10% input from such variable sources. More serious 
research at the time suggested it could be at least 20%, based on then-existing power system 
structures. But Germany has now surpassed 35% (BEE, 2017), and Denmark almost 50% (IEA, 2017). 
The emergence of better power electronics and control technologies (including responsive demand), 
smarter balancing markets, and interconnection, all played a role; dramatic developments in batteries 
open the prospect of significantly higher levels still, with the industry itself undergoing a more 
widespread revolution of both technologies and industry scales and structures.  
 
Figure 5: Technology frontier – overall low carbon systems  
 
The net effect, in terms of the ‘best practice frontier’ for delivering low carbon electricity, is something 
like that displayed in Figure 5. It has enabled some governments to finally take the step analogous to 
the banning of incandescent bulbs, and ban new coal stations, with some having phased out coal 
generation altogether and others having set firm date by which to do so (including the UK, with a 
proposed phase-out date of 2025) (BEIS, 2016).  By any reasonable measure the process is culminating 
as a technology revolution - one substantially driven by policy.  The policies have drawn upon all three 
                                                          
10 “Both deployment and RD&D coincide with increasing knowledge generation and the improved 
competitiveness of renewable energy technologies. We find that both support schemes together have 
a greater effect that they would individually, that RD&D support is unsurprisingly more effective in 
driving patents and that timing matters. Current wind deployment based on past wind RD&D spending 
coincides best with wind patenting. If we look into competitiveness we find a similar picture, with the 
greatest effect coming from deployment.” (Zachmann, Serwaah and Peruzzi, 2014) 
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pillars, but with particular emphasis on deliberate strategic investment – major and interacting 
programmes of mission-oriented innovation.  
 
However, the simple insight from these three examples is that innovation is not a simple product of 
‘strategic investment’.  From the basic ‘frontier’ diagram it is apparent that the faster innovation 
proceeds, the more important the first and second domains may become – if the curve moves due to 
pure ‘technology push’ policies, then the faster it moves, the further consumers (and market 
structures) may otherwise get left behind.  This of course would start to deter further innovation due 
to the lack of market demand.  But the curve can also be pushed by demand – agents moving closer 
to the frontier, or market structures or relative prices moving demand towards different sections of 
the curve. 
 
In terms of the associated policies, the relative mix of the different policy pillars and their interactions 
have differed radically between the three examples (chosen to emphasise the role of Pillars I, II and III 
respectively in the different technology evolutions). To a large degree, the apparently infinite 
complexities of innovation can be understood in terms of the relative mix and interactions of these 
components.  
 
 
6. The innovation chain and cross-sector evidence  
 
The policy pillars which flow from the Three Domains framework are themselves quite high-level 
abstractions. In starting to use the language of ‘technology push’ in relation to consumer or market 
demands, the links start to emerge with processes of technological development as viewed through 
the ‘innovation chain’.   
 
Despite the well-known limitations of a ‘strong linear’ model, as Balconi et al (2010) argued, a weakly 
linear framing of technological development—structured as phases of maturity from invention 
through to maturity—can be useful. It can be particularly relevant for understanding ‘vertical’ 
innovation processes associated with particular sets of technologies in a given sector, without 
forgetting that these are embedded within a broader inter-relationships, feedbacks, and multiple 
origins of and stimuli to technological innovation.11  At minimum, it sets out stages of maturity which 
almost any technology needs to pass through, however many feedbacks there may be along the way. 
In that sense it outlines the journey required for a given class of technologies to evolve to full 
deployment, whether or not the journey contains various dead-ends, retracements of steps, or 
learning about better options along the way as a technology in practice iterates through phases of 
‘learning-by-searching’ and ‘learning-by-doing’ (see eg. GHN (2014) Chapter 9, Box 9.1 ‘Iterating 
innovation’).  We return to this point below.  
 
                                                          
11 Indeed Balconi et al (2010, p.11) note a danger of over-emphasizing the networked and interactive nature of 
technological change in policy advice, since “it might become exceedingly difficult to design, implement and 
evaluate policies in a fully interconnected system. On some occasions, a simplified representation of the process 
of innovation which decomposes a complex system of interactions into (linearly) interconnected subsystems 
might not only be necessary but also desirable.”  
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Figure 6: The Innovation chain 
 
The exact structure of the innovation chain of course can be presented in varied ways, depending on 
the focus of interest; Figure 6 shows an innovation chain, drawn from experience with the UK Carbon 
Trust’s commercialization programmes, which emphasises the central components involved in the 
process of moving from ‘technology-push’ to ‘market pull’ (the latter, in the context of the frontier 
diagram, being pressures from consumers ‘pushing’ up against the frontier). 
 
The innovation chain is a useful structure for thinking about the policy mix across stages of maturity 
of a technology. Different sectors and technology fields face different challenges in enabling 
innovations to develop along this chain, and an understanding of differences in the innovation 
patterns within specific sectors or technology fields can inform how the chain can best be used to 
inform design of an appropriate policy mix.  
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Figure 7: R&D intensities across different sectors and the relationship to the innovation chain 
 
Figure 7 (right hand panel) shows the private R&D intensity (% of revenues spent on R&D) of major 
companies in different sectors, drawn from a database of the world’s top 1500 companies. The striking 
feature is the scale of sectoral differences.  Sectors that are generally considered to be highly 
innovative – like pharmaceuticals and biotechnology – spend in the region 10-15% of their turnover 
on R&D.   
 
However, the energy utilities sectors – electricity, gas (along with water and multi-utilities) spend 
under 0.5% of their sales on R&D.  The oil industry (even for this data, 2011, still in era of high oil prices 
driving new exploration and the emergence of the shale industry) was under 1%; the major energy-
intensive sectors of metals, mining and construction were similar in aggregate.  Of course the data is 
incomplete – energy innovation could occur at least in the middle level (eg. general & industrial 
engineering companies) or in smaller ‘challenger’ companies. But the scale of differences still demand 
explanation and, from a high-level policy perspective, suggests a challenge that decarbonisation 
requires radical innovation in what appear to be some of the least innovative sectors of the economy.  
 
Why such large differences in R&D intensities of major companies between sectors?  The innovation 
systems literature  has recognised structural differences in the innovation performance of sectors and 
technology fields at least since Pavitt (1984) and Dosi (1982). Their work, and subsequent 
developments (Breschi et al. 2000; Malerba 2002) aimed to describe and explain heterogenous 
innovation patterns across sectors. This body of work emphasizes that sectors differ in their conditions 
of appropriability (the ease with which the value of R&D investments can be captured), the nature of 
the knowledge base (distinguishing, for example, the relative role of know-how and craft skills and 
codified scientific knowledge in sectors), alongside the relative technological opportunities across 
sectors.  
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More recently developed systemic perspectives on innovation have their roots in this tradition, but 
they have tended to focus attention on specific technological innovation systems, and as a result have 
at times overlooked these structural differences across sectors or technology fields. Instead, they have 
emphasized system functions within a given technological innovation system (following Hekkert et al. 
2007, and Bergek et al. 2008b), or the broader concept of socio-technical systems that incorporate a 
wider set of concerns (Geels 2004). This backgrounding of structural differences between sectors is 
unfortunate: the conditions of appropriability and nature of the knowledge base remain helpful in 
understanding sectoral patterns of innovation, and corresponding policy interventions across phases 
of the innovation chain. Such a perspective is useful both across broad sectoral groupings (explaining 
differences between energy and pharmaceuticals, for example), but is also useful in comparing 
technology fields within the field of energy.  
 
The recognition of differences in the innovation system characteristics among sectors and technology 
fields is useful, and it is made more so by combining it with the idea of an ‘innovation chain’, as 
suggested by the left hand illustration in Figure 7:  
 In the highly innovative sectors, the development cycle is relatively quick and cheap, and product 
pull is strong: think of the profits potentially available to Apple from the iphone, or to a drugs 
company from a 20-year patent on cancer-inhibiting drug. In such sectors, the innovation chain 
functions effectively, linking technological opportunities with market opportunities and enabling 
new technologies to develop.  
 In the electricity sector, in contrast, the product development cycle tends to be long, expensive, 
and risky: consider nuclear, or indeed, carbon capture and storage which has been pursued for 25 
years now, and it is still only at the stage of demonstration plants.  At the other end of the process, 
all innovations in power generation basically sell the same product – electrons. There is no 
‘premium’ market for a radically new product, they compete largely on cost grounds with 
incumbent technologies that produce the same thing but have benefitted from a century of 
development. The conditions of appropriability – i.e. the degree to which investors can recoup the 
value of their innovation investments – are thus weak. Hence all the energy literature about the 
technology ‘valley of death’, reflecting the fact that these characteristics largely break the 
innovation chain, as graphically suggested in the bottom part of Figure 7 (a). 
 
Of course this is a simplification.  A significant part of energy-sector innovation has occurred in the 
industrial engineering companies, which are in the mid range of Figure 7(b), and which typically spend 
around 3% of their turnover on R&D.  This is still considerably less than the highly innovating sectors, 
and moreover is directed mainly towards the interests of their major clients – the incumbent energy 
industries.  From an evolutionary perspective, this implies that the energy sector will be less capable 
than many other sectors of generating the variety that is essential to enable radical evolutionary 
change. Hence the pattern reflected in Figures 4 & 5 for power generation – innovations in incremental 
improvements for established interests (coal and gas generation), but not radical change until 
governments intervened forcibly to support wholly new forms of power generation, with an important 
step being when wind energy markets had built up enough for some of these companies to enter the 
field, with all the expertise and resources they could bring to bear on scaling up the technology.  
 
So the caveats on data and interpretation do not undermine some basic conclusions: the descriptive 
value of the innovation chain as a useful heuristic framework for structuring understanding about 
22 
 
stages of maturity of emerging energy technologies; the sector- or technology-field characteristics 
that enable a better-connected innovation chain; and the implication of the data that major energy 
transformation beyond established trajectories has to involve strong government action, to bridge the 
technology valley of death and to build markets in radically new ways of making (and using) energy.   
Hence (and complementing the specific studies of wind energy cited in the previous section) the 
sometimes-derided innovation chain provides an obvious answer to ‘the puzzle of fast innovation 
despite modest R&D increases’ observed for renewable energy in the major study by Bettencourt, 
Trancik and Kaur (2013), whose empirically-based model ‘reveals a regular relationship between 
patents, R&D funding, and growing markets across technologies.’ 
 
Combined with underpriced environmental concerns, this makes these sectors a prima fascia case for 
Mission-oriented innovation policies, with a strong dose of Pillar III policies on strategic investment.   
For the pursuit of vertical (sector/technology-specific) innovation, the relationship between the 
innovation chain and the three policy pillars is in many respects straightforward.  ‘Technology push’ is 
largely driven by strategic investments. These are usually led by public sector but not always: large 
companies in particular also make strategic investment decisions based on judgement about future 
trends, risks and positioning, rather than the more specific project cost-benefit appraisal based on 
current markets, or indeed other explicit cost-benefit evaluations. Individuals and occasionally 
philanthropic agents may also undertake strategic technology investments.  Whatever the funding 
source, the ‘technology push’ end of the innovation chain is basically a combination of technology-
neutral processes arising from general R&D and technology spillover, with the way in which Pillar III 
policies contribute to reorienting the technology frontier of Figure 1. 
 
Demand pull, however, is strongly influenced by the other two policy pillars: standards or consumer 
engagement (Pillar 1), or relative prices in competitive markets (Pillar II), driving demand for the 
product.  Thus whilst the contribution of ‘technology push’ can be understood largely in terms of 
spillovers and strategic investments, the challenge of transformation necessarily involves inquiring 
into the demands for new products, arising from current markets (second Domain), as influenced also 
by behavioural and organizational factors (first Domain).  Correspondingly, policy pillars I and II may 
help to accelerate innovation – but, in the absence of strategic investments or fortuitous spillovers (as 
with LEDs), this may predominantly be of an incremental kind, as illustrated with fossil fuel generating 
technologies.  
For sectors like energy in which the ‘technology valley of death’ reflects in part a lack of consumer 
product differentiation, attempts to more radically change the technology landscape for public benefit 
are unlikely to succeed without strategic demand-pull – deliberate, usually subsidized, fostering of 
markets for the new products, usually at higher cost. This, as noted, has been amongst the most 
controversial aspect of innovation policy, for example in renewable energy, but the evidence of Figure 
7 and the logic underpinning it – along with, but not confined to, inadequate carbon pricing - does 
offer clearer economic logic, which as noted is becoming more accepted in some of the economics 
literature (eg. Lehmann and Gawel 2013; Zachman et al 2014). 
 
 
7. The Multiple Journeys 
The rich characterisation provided by innovation systems theories—which see innovation as complex, 
multi-level and path-dependent processes—provides a clear justification for such strategic demand-
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pull policies in driving (or redirecting) a sectoral transformation. The systems literature already cited 
expands beyond ‘technology push’ and ‘demand pull’ forces, to also emphasise soft & systemic 
instruments, and notes the role of complementarity and consistency in policy mixes.  
More broadly, existing conceptual frameworks in the innovation systems literature emphasise 
multiple co-evolving ‘sub-systems’ that accompany technological developments.  The frameworks of 
Freeman and Louca (2011), Foxon (2011), or the elements of socio-technical systems articulated by 
Geels (2004) –deal with technological developments, institutions, user behaviour, business practices, 
supply chains, and so on.  Bergek et al. (2008a,b) articulate several specific ‘functions’ of innovation 
systems which can be considered similarly as addressing the multiple processes involved in major 
transformations. The sheer complexity of full vertical innovation processes can thus be considered as 
arising from the need for innovations to go through multiple stages, which combine supply chain 
developments in the business relations along with the corresponding developments that are far 
outside the control of any company.12  
These broader frameworks in the systems literature are often perceived as inimical to the simple 
‘innovation chain’, and the very richness and complexity of such frameworks can sometimes hinder 
communication and the derivation of clear and specific policy recommendations. This complexity also 
makes it hard to establish a clear analytical relationship to or dialogue with the simpler (and 
quantitatively-oriented) perspectives of classical ‘second Domain’ economic approaches to 
innovation.    
To draw us back to our starting point – the division between the economics and systems innovation / 
evolutionary communities – this paper concludes by suggesting one way to construct a bridge from 
the technology innovation chain to these wider considerations - a relatively simple way of relating 
them - is by considering the path from novel to mature technology as involving multiple journeys, as 
illustrated in Figure 8.  
Figure 8: The Multiple Journeys  
                                                          
12 See for example Special Issue on "Making, Buying and Collaborating for More Sustainable Production and 
Consumption" edited by the Journal of Cleaner Production in 2017 (vol. 155 part 2) 
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As with the chain itself, this can be done at various levels of granularity, and Figure 8 shows the basic 
technology journey from novelty to maturity accompanied by multiple other journeys. These reflect 
developments, across all three domains of socio-economic decision processes, that must accompany 
the evolution of many new technologies – particularly disruptive ones.13   
 In their earliest phases of development, new inventions are often developed by individuals 
operating in a research-based organisation (or corporate R&D lab). As the technology moves into 
the innovation phase however, the scale grows and the emphasis shifts towards producing some 
kind of workable product that can be sold – hence, managerial skills, organisation and interface 
with the private sector becomes important, as the technology starts to become a product and a 
business – a classic point at which the transition falters and technologies languish for years or 
decades. If and as the technology navigates its way across this chasm, the organisational unit must 
transform with it and start to extend its links with others in the supply chain required. Williams 
(2000) noted that “Inasmuch as these two work in tandem, we need to find ways to treat technical 
and organisational innovation in a combined manner..”14  
                                                          
13 This is an elaboration by the author from Carbon Trust (2008) Memorandum 64 presented to the UK House 
of Commons Select Committee Enquiry 
14 Williamson, O.E. (2000) The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead, Journal of 
Economic Literature, vol 38, no 3: 595-613 (p.600) 
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 The journey for customers and standards may be a ‘slow burn’, but failure to identify and engage 
potential customers - markets for the products - in the early stages will cripple attempts to bring 
in private finance. Market development requires early adopters or niche markets, which may 
often involve both first (behavioural) and second (classical economic) drivers.  Information 
campaigns – marketing for the private sector – may be important, but the technology, and its 
uptake and brand value may be influenced by the development of standards relating to 
performance, safety etc, and associated component standardisation which can help supply chain 
development. If the company is a new venture owning the IP, during the stage of 
commercialisation it may sell out to larger companies that have established customer bases, 
networks and brand value, along with the financial muscle to sustain and expand the journey - 
providing the new technology doesn’t threaten to undermine the incumbent’s core interests.  
 The finance journey starts with public or (sometimes) internal corporate funding: there is no 
market, there is merely faith that the idea may prove to yield something of value. Hope and 
intellectual curiosity cannot sustain technology development: that requires money, which sooner 
or later will start to outstrip the capacity of public funding (and may test the patience of parent 
corporate funders). New entrants, not shielded by a parent organisation, may be particularly 
vulnerable as they seek to move beyond pure public grant finance to persuade a bewildering array 
of sceptical private sector ‘angel’ and ’venture’ capital fund managers that their idea is worth 
backing. Indeed, Hall et al (2016) represent the finance sector itself as a complex system spanning 
all three of the domains – behavioural finance, the main ‘market’ characteristics of the established 
finance industries, and finance as an evolutionary system deeply intertwined with regulatory and 
institutional structures.   
 Hence, often overlooked in economics of innovation studies, yet prominent in innovation systems 
research, is the importance of the regulatory journey. Regulation can initially be neutral, but is 
more likely has been designed around incumbent products which may be poorly suited for new 
technologies. As the technology moves towards market, many regulatory barriers may need to be 
overcome – and because of regulatory complexity and the powerful influence of incumbent 
interests this may be a slow process, as with reform of rules around network connection and 
charging and electricity market design in relation to distributed energy resources.  
 Related to this, Institutional structures often need to evolve. A growing sector needs to develop 
its own associations that are eventually able to stand alongside incumbents in the struggles for 
influence over key regulatory, financing and governance decisions.  The priorities and structures 
of government departments themselves may reflect the structures of technological systems, and 
the ability to drive change may owe much to the institutional robustness of decisionmaking 
institutions to make rules contrary to incumbent interests.   
 Finally, as the scale grows, and disruptive technologies may often require new infrastructure to 
grow at scale.  The alignment - or not – of a technology with established infrastructure may 
become more and more important.15  Indeed, the evolutionary economics literature emphasises 
not only the role of niche markets, but the potential for ‘piggybacking’ on existing infrastructure 
until a sector has matured sufficiently to fund – or lobby effectively – for its own infrastructure, 
as with the evolution from modems to broadband.   
                                                          
 
15 Thus the motor car only finally came to realise its potential as horse tracks gave way to tarmac roads.  The 
most obvious modern energy analogy is the mismatch between power systems designed for one-way flows from 
huge centralised stations generating baseload power, compared to the characteristics of decentralised renewable 
energy sources and smart meters which may embed the generation and dynamic use of electricity throughout the 
system. 
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The schematic of ‘multiple journeys’ remains a simplification since it does not illustrate the feedbacks 
or (overtly) linkages, but it underlines the point that technology evolution involves multiple processes, 
alongside the evolution of the technology itself. We suggest that this ‘journeys’ schematic provides a 
clearer mapping of co-evolving sub-systems to the stages of maturity of the technology itself. This 
provides, in our view, a useful way of articulating the need for a policy mix that develops across the 
chain. For policymakers, it provides the outlines of a policy roadmap that goes well beyond the classic 
prescriptions from the economics of innovation (related to pricing and demand-pull), but also provides 
a clearer narrative about innovation support than existing guidance based on avoiding system failures 
(Klein Woolthuis et al. 2005) or supporting key functions (Hekkert et al. 2007).  
Figure 8 orders the ‘other journeys’ going down roughly according to increasing scales, and hence, the 
relative influence of the different domains.  The journeys of organisational structure and development 
of the initial customer base, brand and associated standards can be clearly identified with the first 
Domain.  The next two – journeys of finance and regulatory structures (including market design and 
tax policies), that help to define the market, risk allocations and the prices faced, influence quite 
directly second Domain decision-making – classical economic – processes, as influenced by the 
structures of financial markets and product markets.   The journeys of institutional structures and 
infrastructure correspond chiefly to third Domain processes, and their need to be adjusted to fit new 
technological system regimes. As noted, to an important degree this approach of articulating multiple 
‘journeys’ has clear relations to existing strands of the innovation systems literature. The regulatory, 
institutional and infrastructural journeys can be related to the ‘landscape’ and ‘regime’ levels of the 
multi-level perspective (Geels 2002). Similarly, whilst we would not claim a simple ‘one to one’ 
relationship, most of the functional categories of Bergek et al (2008a) can similarly be mapped: their 
first three functions are largely identified with the technology, organisation and supply chain journeys; 
their functions 4 and 5 (market formation and resource mobilisation) correlate quite well with the 
market and finance journeys.16   
 
 
On complementary perspectives and metrics  
Emphasising the multiple journeys required for successful transformation helps to pinpoint two quite 
distinct components to the intellectual gulf (with which this paper opened) between economic-
innovation and systems innovation / evolutionary perspectives, in terms of the typical metrics of 
quantification: prices, and patents.  
Prices are generally assumed to reflect intrinsic technology costs. But they also have to encompass all 
the other costs and risks represented in Figure 8: the costs of establishing a business and its 
organizational development, the cost of finding and building new supply chains, the risk premia 
imposed by the financial community (particularly for innovations that do not generate a new 
consumer product, but depend on regulated markets contingent on governments and regulatory 
decisions); the institutional hurdles and costs facing a technology striving to displace current industry 
                                                          
16 The first three functions articulated in Bergek et al (2008a) are knowledge development and diffusion; 
influence on direction of search; and entrepreneurial experimentations, which are followed in their ordering 
by (4) market formation and (5) resource mobilisation.  Their final two functions (legitimisation and positive 
externalities) are harder to map – they note that ‘positive externalities’ are “not independent of the other 
functions but rather indicates the dynamics of the system on a functional level” - though of course the Third 
Domain processes involving the Third Domain ‘journeys’ in Figure 8 (regulatory structures, institutions and 
infrastructure) may be particularly important in this.  
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models. Thus, the economic interpretation tends to focus on price as indicating the intrinsic resource 
requirements of a technology, i.e. just the first of the journeys, but it may just as much indicate misfits 
with current systems and the obstacles that need to be overcome on all the other dimensions of the 
multiple journeys required. Of course these are also real costs – but essentially transitional ones, a 
measure of the effort required to overcome the barriers to a more ‘level playing field’ between new 
and incumbent technologies. 
The other indicator concerns patents, the main workhorse of most economic studies of the innovation 
process, widely used as an index of the productivity of both R&D and market incentives to promote 
innovation. But patents only record one form of innovation – and one that is likely to predominate in 
the earlier stages of the innovation chain.  The latter stages – the economic improvements from scale, 
experience, and better supply chains; the growing management expertise and value of more confident 
financiers; the gains from more appropriate regulation, institutions and infrastructure – none of these 
generate patents.  
In short, the two main metrics used to inform the more quantified ‘second domain’ economic 
perspectives on innovation tend to focus attention and measurement on just the top-left hand area 
of Figure 8. Not surprisingly, therefore, the discourse defined in terms of ‘correcting’ for the ‘market 
failures’ of spillover, and inadequately priced externalities, lead to policy recommendations 
emphasizing R&D and carbon prices, and tend to decry the ‘inefficiency’ of the strategic demand-pull 
policies (as typified by renewable energy feed-in tariffs) (e.g. Boehringer and Rosendahl, 2011; Fischer 
et al. 2013). Some economists have started to challenge this on grounds of learning-by-doing, path 
dependency and potential co-benefits of renewable energy supports (eg. Lehmann and Gawal 2013) 
but this remains controversial within the discipline.  
Yet effective mission-oriented innovation has to span the full scope of Figure 8. Not surprisingly 
therefore, systems innovation researchers – and the companies pursuing the new technologies - 
naturally place far more emphasis upon the necessity of support – or at least, consistency and 
coherence - across the multiple journeys associated with practical deployment.  
A map for the evolution of policy packages  
The frameworks presented in this paper can inform policy mixes at two distinct levels. The high-level 
implications are as illustrated in Box 1 (Figure 2): the value of policies across all three pillars, to 
influence decision-making in the corresponding domains. As discussed elsewhere (GHN 2014, 
concluding chapter) for energy transformation this can also provide a more compelling narrative 
around the prospects for keeping energy bills constant, as progress on energy efficiency and 
innovation offsets the price impact of internalising external costs.  
Beyond this somewhat high-level categorisation, Figure 8 offers a tool for more specific diagnosis.  
Nothing in Figure 8 implies the need for central coordination, but it quite clearly implies potential need 
for multiple instruments in any transformative process. To use the typology developed in Rogge and 
Reinhardt (2016), it offers a map of potential elements to be considered. These are more likely to be 
consistent if different instruments support a technology’s evolution across the different journeys. This 
requires a policy strategy (loosely – a high-level view of how a technology could evolve from left to 
right, ie. objective and principal plans), supported by coherence of process – most obviously, a 
perspective spanning from top to bottom of Figure 8 to ensure that the very different actors involved 
in the different journeys (Treasuries and sectoral departments, regulatory agencies etc) share in the 
same ultimate goal of mission-oriented innovation. 
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Innovation, like health, is complex: there is no universally right policy mix, any more than a doctor 
would prescribe treatment without examining the patient. Technologies like IT & pharmaceuticals may 
require little beyond the standard prescription of markets, industry standards and the protection of 
property rights.  The data of Figure 7, however, indicate that energy sector innovation, left to itself, is 
in much poorer health.  
The process of innovation on the technology journey cannot proceed too far (or efficiently) if there 
are major roadblocks on the other journeys.  Policy packages need to be grounded not only in the 
general nature of the problem (an innovation chain broken by expensive technology push, network 
dependency, and lack of product differentiation, amongst other factors). They need to reflect the 
stage of evolution and where on the multiple journeys the critical obstacles lie. Thus for example, one 
can see that even with improved renewable technology and strong market supports from government, 
important roadblocks in the evolution of renewables have included unfamiliarity to the finance sector, 
a range of regulatory barriers (including planning consents, generator licencing and terms of grid 
connection), with multiple barriers in the regulatory, institutions and infrastructure journeys arising 
from the current organisation of most power systems around large, centralised generation.  
To conclude: this should not be interpreted as simply a way of supporting the case for ‘systems 
innovation’ approaches in contrast to mainstream economic approaches. It is entirely possible that 
those pre-occupied with trying to help demonstrated technologies through the multiple journeys may 
overlook both the greater potential of even newer technologies (actual or prospective) that could 
emanate from R&D, and the strategic value of broad-based incentives like carbon pricing to change 
the positioning of major players essential to the transition. But it equally true that more traditional 
economic perspectives, focused on the familiar second Domain indices of prices, competition, and 
patents, are likely to overlook and undervalue the importance of addressing all the journeys, across 
all the domains, in ways that can only really be delivered by strategic deployment with clear public 
goals in mind.   
The case is thus not that one of the London conferences mentioned in the opening was more useful 
than the other – but that to really help improve policy mixes for transformative changes, the two 
communities need to combine around a common and broader framework of understanding, big 
enough to recognize what each can bring to the table.  
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